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Human Capacities and the Proble1n of 
Universally Equal Dignity: Two Philosophical 
Test Cases and a Theistic Response 
Matthew Petrusek 
F
EW WORDS IN CONTEM PORARY MORAL DISCOURSE have the 
same immediate traction as the term " human dignity." Politi-
cians, lawyers, preachers and priests, human rights advocates, 
academic theorists, and campaigners of all stripes regu larly 
appeal to dignity as the foundationa l warrant for their manifold causes, 
even when they bitterly disagree with each other. ft may not always 
be the first claim in the chain of reason ing, but, if all else fa ils, it fre-
quently ends up being the last. Why, for example, should poverty be 
eradicated? "Because it is an affront to human dign ity," activists tell 
us. Why should foreign dictators be toppled? "So the uni versal yearn-
ing fo r human dignity can break free ," say opposition leaders and their 
international supporters. Why should thi s healthcare, or housing, or 
debt-forgiveness bill be passed? "Because dignity calls for no less," 
protcstors clamor. Or why should stem cell research be funded? "Be-
cause it advances human dignity," say researchers. Why shou ld it be 
proh ibited? "Because it undermines human dignity ," respond church 
leaders. Many agree that animal-human hybrids pose a threat to human 
dignity. But some a lso mainta in that alleged unfa ir labor practices, 
which , depending on the political platform, may include insufficient 
paid vacation time, do the same. An organization called "Dignitas" in 
Switzerland offers its clients what it ca ll s "death with dignity," a com-
mon euphemism for assisted suicide. Opponents argue that such a 
practice constitutes a grave violation of human dignity itself. 
Indeed, human dignity not only li es at the heart of a potpourri of 
moral di sputcs--oft:cn with each side claiming that it is the one "true" 
defender or advancer of human worth- but also serves as the founda-
tional bal last of entire charters and declarations. The first article of the 
Charter of Fundamental Human Rights of the European Union , fo r 
example, asserts, "Human dignity is invio labl e. It must be respected 
and protected." 1 The earl ier and more internationa lly recogni zed 
1 ·'Charter of Fundamenta l Rights of the Eu ropean Uni on," Office .Journal of the Eu-
ropean Communities 364 (2000) :9. 
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United Nations document, The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, commences si milarly: "[the] recognition of the inherent dig-
nity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the hu-
man family is the foundation of freedom , j ustice and peace in the 
world."2 Confirming the ethical centrality of di gnity to the document, 
article one goes on to affirm, "All human beings arc born free and 
equal in dignity and rights." Remarkably, when the fina l form of The 
Declaration was approved in December of 1948, on ly eight nations 
abstained from approving it, and not one dissentcd. 3 Though divided 
into Communist and non-Communist blocks and still ravaged by the 
effects of World-War II , almost the entire world came together (at 
least on paper) to recognize the existence of uni versa l human worth. 
Rarely has the global community seen such consensus- a consensus 
that over 60 years later appears to continue growing, at least on em-
pirical grounds .4 
To be sure, some prominent naysayers have emerged along the way. 
The util itarian philosopher Peter Singer has long provided readers 
with a meticulously crafted case against the existence of human worth, 
arguing that it amounts to an unjustified for;n of di scrimination he 
calls "spccicsism."5 The Harvard psycho logist Steven Pinker has also 
2 The Un ited Nations, ' 'The Universal Declaration of Human Rights," www.un.org/ 
cn/documents/udhr/ . 
3 The Uni ted Nat ions, ' 'History of the Document," www. un.org/cn/docu-
ments/udhr/hi story.shtml. It is a lso interesting to note that artic le one o f the 1949 and 
1990 German Constitut ions (the text was amended in part allc r the 1990 unifi cation 
of West and East Germany) reads, "Die WLirdc des Mensch en isl unanlastbar. Sic zu 
achten und zu schi.itzcn ist Vcrpflichtung all cr staatlichcn Gcwalt. " Translated: "Hu-
man dignity is unassa ilable. To respect and protect it is the duty of a ll state authority." 
See The German Government, "Grundgcsctz fiir d ie Bundcsrcpublik Dcutschland," 
www.gcsetze-im-intcrnct.de/bundcsrccht/gg/gcsamt.pdf. 
Even if one agrees with the claims in the German Constitut ion and The Uni versal 
Declaration of Human Rights and I think most people would !he conception of 
dignity in these documents remains deeply prob lematic because it is in no way clear, 
in either document, how or why human dignity can be both universally and inherently 
equal while a lso being somethi ng that needs to be protected. Certain ly declarations 
and constitutions do not bear the burden of exhausti vely justifying !heir first princi-
ples; but the problem is that the first principles, in these cases, appear to be contrad ic-
tory at least without substantia l additional e laboration and explanat ion . 
4 The 1989 United Nations Treaty, "Convention on the Rights o f the Chi ld," for ex-
ample, also includes language recogn izing the "fundamental. ... dign ity and worth of 
the person" (sec The United Nations, "Convention on !he Rights of the Child," 
www.ohchr.org/en/profcssionalintcrest/pagcs/crc.aspx). Accord ing to the U nited Na-
tions website, 194 countries arc current ly a party to the treaty. ln!crcstingly, the United 
States has signed the treaty, but has not yet ratified it (sec The Uni ted Nations, "Treaty 
Collection," https://trcaties.un.org/Pagcs/V icwDctai ls.aspx?src= TREt\ TY &mtdsg_ 
no=IV-1 I &chaptcr=4&Jang=cn). 
5 Singer's writ ing provides a multitude of quotable materi al on thi s point, but here is 
a succinct expression : 'The doctr ine of the sanctity of human Ii re , as it is normall y 
1-
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recently come out against the va lidity of human dignity as an ontolog-
ical or ethical principle; in 2008 he wrote an influential article in The 
New Repuhlic- polcmically entitled, "The Stupidity of Human Dig-
nity"-that lambastes the use of dignity as a basis for making moral 
judgments, especially in biocthics.6 So it is certainly inaccurate to say 
that the belief in human dignity is anywhere near universal, either in-
side or outside the academy. 
But it is certainly widespread, even global. Just imagine getting 
elected or holding a prominent position- or, for that matter, being ac-
cepted among polite company- in most parts of the world wh il e pub-
lica lly denying the ex istence of equal human worth. Not even far left 
environmental parties who sec humanity as a threat to the planet or far 
right cu ltural purity parties who sec certain ethnic, religious, or racia l 
groups as a threat to civi lization make that claim, at least open ly. Call 
it, to borrow from John Rawls, an overlapping consensus. 
But why the agreement? And what, exactly, is the agreement about? 
Peek beneath the near unanimity on human di gni ty's existence, and it 
quickly becomes apparent that there is a great diversity, if not cacoph-
ony, of viewpoints on dignity 's origin, speci fi e character, and ethical 
implications. Indeed, like many other deeply loaded moral terms 
("fairness" is another good example), what human dignity enjoys in 
general acceptance, it frequently lacks in clarity and coherence, a re-
ality this article' s introductory examples seek to capturc.7 
understood, has at its co re a discrimination on the basis of species and nothing else" 
(sec Peter S inger, Unsanr.:tijj,ing Human Life, ed. Helga Kuhse [Ma lden, Ma: Black-
well Publishing, 2002], 22 1 ). S inger offers a susta ined critique in this text not only of 
th e c laim that humans have unique va lue his understanding of that which bestows 
worth on a liv ing being has roots in Jeremy Bentham's fomous query : "The questi on 
is not can they reason? nor Can they talk? but Can they surfe r?" but also of the claim 
that humans have unique ly equal worth . All attempts by theologians and philosophers 
to establish universa lly eq ual human dignity have Je ll him thoroughly unconvinced: 
"[The] appeal to the intrinsic dignity of human beings appea rs to solve the cgalitar-
ian's problems on ly as long as it goes unchallenged. O nce we ask why it shou ld be 
that all humans including infants, mental defecti ves, psychopaths, Hit ler, Stalin and 
the rest have some kind of dignity or worth that nu e lephant, pig, or chimpanzee can 
ever achi eve, we sec that this question is as difficu lt tu answer as our original request 
for some re levant fact that justifies the inequality or humans and other animals" 
(Si nger, Unsanr.:ti/ying Human Life, 9 1 ). 
<, Pinker writes, fo r exa mp le, "The prob lem is that ' dignily ' is a squ ishy, subject ive 
not ion , hard ly up to the heavyweight mora l demands ass igned to it. " He argues that 
·'autonomy," in contrast, has an objective, fi xed meaning, and should be used in mora l 
discourse rather than "d ignity." Sec Steven Pinker, "The Stupid ity of Human Dig-
nity", The New Republic, May 28, 2008, http ://pinkcr.wj h.harvarcl.edu/ art ic lcs/mc-
dia/Thc%20Stupidity%20o1%20Dignity.htm. 
7 Another instruct ive way to sec the conceptua l e last ic it y of human worth in action is 
to search for "human dignity" on the White House's wcbpagc. There arc nut on ly 
hundreds of results from di ffc rcnt speeches, rcrnarks, executive orders, etc., but the 
,( 
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Several books and articles have recently emerged addressing th is 
basic defin itional problem. The more prominent include political the-
orist Michael Rosen's Dignity: Its History and Meaning, philosopher 
George Katcb 's Human Dignity, and theological ethicist Gilbert Mei-
laendcr's Neither Beast Nor God: The Dignity of the Human Person, 
as well as an excellent seri es of essays in Human Dignity and Bioeth-
ics . Each text distinctively addresses the problematic status of "human 
worth" in contemporary moral discourse, especially w ith regards to its 
definitional elasticity and the frequency with whi ch it appears in sup-
port of various causes without a systematic defense of its meaning or 
moral val idity.8 
contexts in whi ch the President uses the term also vary widely. Those contexts in-
clude: national security, sexual assault awareness, regulatory impact analys is, health 
care, torture, human rights, the rights of women and girls, the death of Osama Bin 
Laden, economic growth, economic all iances, environmental initiatives, dip lomacy, 
foreign independence movements, combating sex tra ffi cking, the Nati onal Day of 
Prayer, and economic sanctions, among others. 
Perhaps even more interesting than th is topi cal divers ity arc th e different fo rms that 
human dignity takes within the same speech. For examp le, iri prepared remarks to 
honor the awarding of th e Nobel Peace Prize to Lu i Xiaobo, a Chinese human rights 
activist and pol itical pri soner, Pres ident Obama states just arrcr the introduction, "All 
ofus have a responsibil ity to bui ld a j ust peace that recognizes the inherent rights and 
dign ity of human beings a truth upheld within the Universal Declara tion of Human 
Rights" (my emphasis). He then declares, a few lines later, " [Mr. ] Liu reminds us that 
human di gnity also depend1· upon the advance of democracy, open society, and the 
ru le of law" (See Barak Ohama, "Statement by Pres ident on the Awarding of Nobel 
Peace Prize," www. Whitehouse.Gov/the-press-officc/20 I 0/ 12/ l 0/statcmcnt-presi-
dent-awarding-nobel-peacc-prize, my emphasis) . 
On the one hand, these sound like boiler-plate, non-controvers ial claims for this kind 
of context, at least to an American audience. On the oth er hand , they contradict each 
other: if dignity is inherent then it should not, conceptuall y, depend on anything. Like-
wise, if dignity depends on cc,tain social and political c ircumstances (or anyth ing 
else), then it is not clear how it could be either inherent or, fo r that matter, universal. 
Th is is not, I believe, a ni t-p icky di stinction : human dignity lies at th e core of the 
argument President Obama employs to honor and defend Mr. Liu, and yet the two 
uses of the term in the speech arc incompatible, at least without substantia l additional 
elaboration. Th is kind of incompatibility, moreover, is not isolated to Pres ident 
Obama's use of dignity. Claiming that human worth is both inherent and in need of 
protection/advancemcnt--without expla ining how these two characteri stics can co-
herently coexist is common in contempora1y moral discourse. 
8 I will be drawing from Martha Nussbaum 's article in Human Dignity and Bioethics, 
"Human Dignity and Political Entitlement" for thi s essay. Several other essays in the 
collection effecti vely frame and reply to the question of human digni ty's definit ion 
and source. However, none, in my view, adequately respond to what I take to be one 
of human dignity's fundamental questions: What, from a conceptual perspective, is 
the condition for the possib il ity of defi ni ng dignity as both uni versal and equal? In 
other words: What is conceptually necessary in order fo r ''human dignity" to coher-
ently apply to all human beings in equal measure? My answer, as the essay w ill seek 
to demonstrate, is that dignity must be defined as " invulnerable. " I believe it is thi s 
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Yet notwithstanding this re latively small body of literature, and de-
spite the ubiquity of the term " human digni ty" in contemporary moral 
discourse, there remains a problemati c dearth of philosophical and the-
ological work dedicated to systematica ll y dc f'ining and de fending dig-
nity 's full meaning. In parti cular, there remains a lack of clarity on 
what unique human characteristic, or characteristics, coul d coherently 
account for dignity's purported uni versality and equa lity. The norma-
ti ve defini tion of human dignity thus remains an open and press ing 
issue. Theory needs to catch up with practice. 
To this end, thi s article seeks to help lay the theoretical groundwork 
for a normati ve definiti on o f human worth by, first, identifying the 
conceptual parameters required to describe dignity as both l) uni versal 
and 2) equal , and then, second, testing th ree substantive accounts of 
dignity- those present in the thought o f moral philosopher Alan 
Gewirth , politica l theori st Martha Nussbaum, and theologian St. Pope 
John Paul IL- in light of those parameters. It is important to stress at 
the outset that my goa l is not to identify which conception of digni ty 
is " true" in the sense of rationally necessary or otherwise persuasively 
demonstrable, though that is, of course, an important goal. Rather, I 
am seeking to establi sh which conception o f dignity is coherent within 
the conceptual parameters o f " uni versality" and "equali ty." And by 
"coherent" I only mean, in a minimal sense, not self-contradictory. It 
would be incoherent, for example, for a definiti on of dignity to affirm 
"a ll human beings sometimes have universall y equal worth depending 
on the ir socio-hi storical circumstances." The clai m contradi cts itself; 
if something is uni versa l, it cannot depend on any set of circumstances 
nor can it " sometimes" be the case. ln this instance, we would have 
good reason to reject such a view of dignity on the grounds of its in-
consistency. 
However, to rule out a particul ar view of digni ty in this way does 
not tell us what constitutes the right or true view of di gnity . In thi s 
sense, the arti cle onl y seeks to test the internal coherence of three dif-
ferent views o f dignity, not to estab lish which, if any, is true. Put dif-
ferently, I am seeking to identify a valid argument fo r the theoretical 
conceptual requirement of invulnerabi lity that contemporary philosoph ica l and theo-
logica l accounts of human di gni ty, including the other texts listed above, have either 
overl ooked or undcrapprcciatcd - a lacuna, I beli eve, that has led to substantia l con-
fu sion w ith regards to digni ty ' s defin ition and ethi ca l implications. Sec Edmund Pe l-
legr ino, /\damn Schulman, and Thomas Merril , eds. l-li1111a11 Dignity and Bioethics 
(Notre Dame: Uni versity of Notre Dame Press, 2009), Gilbert Meil aendcr, Neither 
Beast Nor God: The Dignity of the Human Person (New York: New Atlantis Books, 
2009), and George Kaleb, Human Dignity (Ca mbridge: 1 larvard U nivers ity Press, 
2011 ). 
-
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foundations of universal and equal dignity, not, necessarily, a sound 
one.9 
Given these preliminary parameters, I wish to advance the follow-
ing argument: if we seek to define human dignity as universally equal 
among all human beings, then any account of human dignity that de-
fines human worth according to human capacities must be understood 
as incoherent. The "if' here is crucial. I am not arguing that we ought 
to define human dignity as universally eq ual in this context or that 
definitions of dignity that arc not universally equal arc necessarily in-
ternally incoherent. l am, rather, deliberately assuming a starting 
premise, sidestepping the foundational question of its justification. 
The premise is that human dignity, whatever else it might be or entail, 
is both universal and equal among a ll beings whom we otherwise de-
fine as "human ." 10 lf we accept this claim, I argue, then we arc com-
9 ln a basic sense, a valid argument is one in which the conclus ion necessari ly follows 
from the premises. /1. sound argument is val id, w ith the added criteri on that the prem-
ises are a lso true. Take for example, the fol lowing argument: premise I) a ll human 
beings have ~o.ual dignity; premise 2) equal dignity bestows human eq ual rights on all 
humans; premise 3) basic education is a human right; premise 4) Julia is a human 
being; therefore, the conclus ion : Julia has a right to basic education. This is a va lid 
argument; given the premises, we have no other option bu t to conc lude that Julia has 
a right to basic education. To conc lude otherwise wou ld be, in a decis ive sense, inco-
herent and, hence, irrational. 
However, is the argument also sound in addition to being va lid? That wou ld depend 
on demonstrating the truth of each one of the premises, an immensely complex task 
that would include do ing foundat ional work in both ethics and meta-ethics (that is, 
not only identifying fou ndationa l moral principles but also establishing the ulti mate 
origin of those principles and how, cpistcmologica lly, they can be known). This artic le 
docs try to do this kind of work . Thus, in claiming that I seek to establi sh a va li d rather 
than sound argument for universa lly equal dign ity, I am c la iming that I will deliber-
ate ly not seek to determine the truth of premise "human beings have universa ll y equa l 
dignity. " 1 on ly seek, rather, to determine the va lid conclusion that must follow, as-
suming this premise as a starting point. 
10 Insofar as this article seeks to establish the formal , conceptua l grounds for defining 
dignity as universally equal, 1 do not seek to provide a specific, substantive definition 
of what normatively constitutes a human being. In other words, I am not seeking to 
substantively answer the quest ion "what is a human'>" eit her descripti vely or norma-
tively in this context. 
That said, it is difficu lt to conceptuali ze human dignity as being uni versal and equal 
if it only applies to a subset of humanity. Indeed, if human d ignity only applies to 
some human beings, or app lies to all human beings but unequa ll y, then it is, by defi-
ni tion, not universal and/or equal. The quest ion wou ld therefore be: what do we call 
those "entities" that are not human (or fo lly human) but a lso, apparent ly, not anyth ing 
e lse in existence? Can something be both not (fu lly) human and not (ful ly) anything 
e lse? The logical principle of identity appears to preclude thi s c laim. Thus, from a 
descriptive standpoint, at least, it seems necessarily to be the case that something is 
either uniquely a human or not unique ly a human, and one of the rnain points this 
artic le is seeking to advance is that if human dignity is universally equa l, then, by 
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mittcd to rejecting all accounts of human dignity that find their justi-
ficatory warrant in some form of human capacities, which includes the 
accounts of both Alan Gcwirth and Martha Nussbaum. 11 
ln light of th is argument, 1 wil l conclude by arguing that John Paul 
H's theistic account of dignity can coherently support the claim that 
dignity is universally equal because it is grounded in a divine-human 
re lationship, a relationship that recognizes the va lue of human capac-
ities yet is not dependent upon them . 
GEWIRTH AND NUSSBAUM: DIGNITY BASED ON HUMAN DOING 
Before establishing and defending what constitutes "universal ity" 
and "equality" as they apply to a general conception of human dignity, 
it is important to identify and exposit the specific accounts of dignity 
in Alan Gcwirth and Martha Nussbaum, letting them speak for them-
selves, as it were, before I seek to impose a conceptual framework on 
their thought. The reason r have chosen to engage Gcwirth and Nuss-
baum in particular is because each represents a conception of human 
worth that finds its grounding in a human capacity or set of capacities: 
"agency," as we wi ll sec in Gewirth, and "capabilities" in Nussbaum. 
Let me first turn to Gewirth. 
Gewirth, Human Agency, and the Supreme Principle of Morality 
Gcwirth lays out hi s systematic case for human dignity in his book, 
Reason and Morality ( 1978), though he also provides a condensed re-
statement of his position in a later work, The Community of Rights 
( I 996). [ derive my own treatment of Gewirth 's argument for dignity 
ch iefly, though not exclusively, from the latter work, desp ite the fact 
that he develops his position more extensively in the former. The rea-
son is that Gewirth ' s basic argument can, as he demonstrates in the 
first chapter of The Community of Rights, be summarized concisely 
without sacrificing the argument's force and cogency. 
The first step in Gcwirth 's argument requires him to establish and 
defend what he describes as an "agent." Gcwirth argues that whatever 
we mean by action, we must at least mean that which is the object of 
definition, a ll that which is uniquely human must fri ll under the umbre ll a of that 
worth otherw ise we are using the term ;.human dignil y" incoherently. 
11 While ne ither Nussbaum nor Gewirth explicitli1 c laim they arc seeking to establish 
a un iversa lly equa l definiti on of human dignity, their respect ive arguments certain ly 
imply tha t the ir use of't he words " human" or ''person" mora ll y include as many indi-
vidua ls as possib le under the umbrel la of equa l human worth a ll of those with "hu-
man capac it ies" fo r Nussbaum and a ll of those w ith "autonomy," or the potential fo r 
autonomy, for Gcwirth. ln this sense, each is implicitly sugges ting that they view lrn-
man worth as both un iversa l and equa l. On these grounds, I beli eve ·'un iversa l equa l-
ity" can serve as a fi xed conceptual standard for evaluati ng the internal coherence of 
thei r respect ive mora l theories. 
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all practical precepts, whether they arc moral precepts or not-that is, 
whether the precepts apply to what one ought categorically do inde-
pendently of one's interests (moral precepts) or what one ought do in 
order to pursue one's interests (prudential precepts). Y ct any precept, 
he argues- that is, any statement that is made with the intention of 
guiding action- necessarily implies that the object of the precept, the 
person to whom the precept is addressed, is both I ) voluntary and 2) 
purposive. In other words, any practical precept, qua precept, neces-
sarily implies that the object of the precept is both free (voluntary) and 
capable of acting for an end or goal (purposive). Gcwirth also calls 
these two foundational characteristics the "generic foaturcs of action." 
The term "agent" thus applies to individuals who act voluntarily and 
with purpose. 
Having defined agency, Gewirth then seeks to demonstrate how 
acting as an agent necessari ly implies the existence and recognition of 
a supreme principal of morality, which includes within it both the ex-
istence of each agent's fundamental dignity and the existence of basic 
negative and positive rights based on that dignity. This conception of 
dignity and human rights is "necessary" for Gcwirth , in the sense of 
being rationally necessary. As he explains, "Any agent, s imply by vir-
tue of being an agent, must admit, on pain of sci f-contradiction, that 
he ought to act in certain determinate ways. " 12 These "certain deter-
minate ways" reflect the existence and moral authority of the supreme 
principle of morality. 
The movement from agency to the supreme principle of morality, 
or, to put it differently, the movement from the "is" of the agent to the 
"ought" that governs her action, takes place by a process of reasoning 
Gcwirth calls "dialectical necessity." Put simply, dialectical necessity 
means establishing what any agent, qua agent, must necessarily affirm 
in performing any action at all. By means of this necessity, Gcwirth 
seeks to establish what he calls "two theses," which, together, consti-
tute the supreme principle of morality and the justification for human 
dignity. In his own words: 
The first thesis is that every agent logica ll y must accept that he or she 
has rights to freedom and well-being. The second is that the agent log-
ically must also accept that all other agents also have these rights 
equally with his or her own, so that in thi s way the existence of uni-
versa l moral rights, and thus of human ri ghts, must be accepted with in 
the whole context of action and practiee. 13 
12 Alan Gcwirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: Un iversi ty ofChieago Press, 1978), 
26. 
13 Gewirth, Reason and Morality, 17, author 's emphasis. 
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These two theses ultimate ly enta il the conclusion, for Gcwirth, that 
human beings have rights by virtue of their agency. Any c laim to the 
contrary is to engage in pragmatic self-contradiction . 
Agency and Human Dignity 
Although Gcwirth rarely uses the term " di gnity," he makes it c lear 
that the supreme principle of mora lity that he derives from the agcntial 
structure of human action is tantamount to a supreme principle of dig-
nity , a point he makes explicit when he recasts his entire argument in 
terms of human worth . The passage is worth citi ng at length: 
[A]ll agents attribute va lue o r worth to the purposes for which they 
act. But since the agents arc the sources or loc i of th is att ribution of 
worth, they must a lso attribute worth to themselves . T heir purposes 
arc conceived as hav ing worth or va lue because the agents themselves 
have worth . T his attribution o f wo rth to the agents encompasses not 
on ly thei r purposiveness as such but also the abilit ies of reason and 
wil l that enter into their agency. For acting for purposes agents use 
both wil l and reason: will in their freedom as cont ro ll ing their behav-
ior by their unforced choice and in their endeavors to achieve their 
purposes; reason in ascerta ining the means to their ends, in attributing 
to themselves rights to the necessary conditions of their agency and 
in accepting that all other agents also have these rights. Even if they 
reason incorrectly or will what is wrong, each agent must recogni ze 
in herself and others the general abilities that g ive worth to human life 
and action and that ground her attribution oft he rights of agency. Hu-
man dignity cons ists in hav ing and at least potent iall y using these abi l-
ities, and human ri ghts arc derived from human d ign ity thus con-
ce ived. 14 
The passage reveal s the deep interp lay of agency- and in particular, 
agcntial action- and human worth in Gcwi rth 's thought. To be an 
agent is to have worth , and to have worth means tha t one is an agent, 
or, at least, a prospective agent. More specifica lly, it appears that both 
reason and will- the capacities that underpin an agent's more general 
capacity to act voluntari ly and with purposiveness- arc that which ul-
timate ly bestow value on human beings. In other words, human beings 
have va lue because we arc agents or prospect ive agents; but we arc 
agents or prospective agents only because we have, or w ill have, the 
capacities of " reason" and "wil l." In thi s sense, then, agency broadly, 
and reason and will more specifica lly, arc, in e ffect, the cause of hu-
man dignity; they arc those characteristi cs that justify why human be-
ings not only have worth , but a lso uniquely human worth. 
14 Gcwirth, Reason and Morality, 66 , emphasis added. 
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Nussbaum and the Dignity of Human Capacities 
Martha Nussbaum takes a more comprehensive approach to defin-
ing human dign ity. While she, like Gcwirth , upholds the fundamental 
importance of agency as the ground of human worth- especially 
agency as it relates to the human capac ity for rationality- she cautions 
against defining worth exclusively on agency and rationality. She 
writes in a recent essay, "Human Dign ity and Political Entit lements," 
for example, " [It] is quite crucial not to base the ascription o[ human 
dignity on any single ' basic capability' (rationality, for example), 
since this excludes from human dignity many human beings with se-
vere mental disabilities." 15 
Rationality and the capacity for agcntia l action thus form on ly one 
component of Nussbaum's conception of dignity . Her full account of 
human worth includes several other "basic capabilities," as she calls 
them, and it is these capabilities, in turn, that provide the justification 
of her conception of human worth: "[F]ull and equal human dignity," 
she writes, "is possessed by any chi ld of human parents who has any 
of an open-ended di sjunction of basic capabi lities for major human 
lifc-activitics." 16 Indeed, she goes on to specify that human capacities 
not only confer dignity on humans, but also, more fundamcntally,pos-
sess dignity themselves. The locus of human dignity, in other words, 
is within human capacities. As she writes whi le describing how rape 
violates dign ity, for example, "A woman ... has sentience, imagi nation, 
emotions, and the capacity for reasoning and choice; to force sexual 
intercourse on her is inappropriate, lacking in respect for the dignity 
that those capacities possess."17 
The capacities of "sentience," imagination," "emotions," " reason ," 
and "choice" constitute only part of the list of central human capabil-
ities. Others include li fe, bodily health, bodily integrity, affiliation 
with others, non-discrimination, contact with other species, play, and 
control over one's environment. 18 Taken together, it is this cluster of 
human capacities for what Nussbaum calls "major human life activi-
ties" that account for how and why human beings have worth qua hu-
man beings. 
It is important to note, as Nussbaum acknowledges, that this con-
ception of dignity has deeply Aristotelian roots; to be human is not 
only to be something ontological ly static- a human being- but also 
to be something that develops, a "human becoming." And it is by 
15 Martha Nussbaum, "Human Dignity and Political Entitlements," in H11111a11 Dignity 
and Bioethics, eds E. Pellegrino, A. Schulman , and T. Merrill (Notre Dame, IN: Uni-
vers ity of Not re Dame Press, 2009), 362. 
16 Nussbaum, "Human Dignity and Political Entitlements," 363 . 
17 Nussbaum, " Human Digni ty and Political Ent itlements," 359, emphas is added. 
18 Sec Nussbaum, "Human Dignity and Po litical Entit lements," 377-8. 
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means of exercising one 's basic human capacities, she argues, that one 
can and docs become fu lly human in the normative sense, a state of 
ex istence she also ca ll s "human fl ourishing." 
On thi s point it is important to stress, however, that Nussbaum docs 
not seek to identi fy a single standard of normative humanity to which 
all human li ves ought to confo rm. Herc she departs from Aristotelian-
ism to embrace something more akin to Rawlsian libera lism; we ought 
not seek to enforce one vision o f the comprehensive good, be it reli-
gious or secular, in any given pol iti cal community. "[It] is itself vio-
lative of human dign ity," she argues, "to base political arrangements 
on a single comprehensive doctrinc ." 19 Her emphasis on grounding 
di gnity on human capacities thus fa lls on the possession and exercise 
of the capacities themselves, not on what any given indiv idual uses 
them fo r. To be human and have worth, that is, is to have basic human 
capacities; to be a unique person is to use those capacities to strive for 
any morall y li cit goal one chooses, insofar as there is not one norma-
ti ve goa l that a ll humans ought to pursue. As she writes , " [H]uman 
beings have a worth that is indeed inalienable, because of thei r capac-
ities for various forms of acting and stri ving. "20 
Nussbaum's conception o f digni ty thus rests on a broader theoret-
ical fo undation than Gcwirth's. Humans not on ly have dign ity because 
we arc rational and purposive agents; we also have dign ity because we 
have unique capabilities to become more human by exercising a broad 
array of distinctively human capacities . Each capacity is fundamen-
ta lly re lated to what it means to be human. Indeed, Nussbaum goes fa r 
beyond a s trictly agcntial account o f digni ty by add itionally recogniz-
ing a deep connection . between uniquely human needs and uniquely 
human worth: "There is a digni ty not onl y in rationa li ty," she wri tes, 
"but in human need itself and in the varied forms of' striving that 
emerge fro m human nccd ."21 
T HE C ONDITION FOR T II E POSSIBI LITY OF UNIVERSAL EQUALITY 
Notwithstanding the fundamenta l differences between Gcwirth and 
Nussbaum, it is important to recognize that both ground their respec-
ti ve conceptions o f digni ty on human capaciti es. To be human in a 
moral sense is derived from human doing- or the potential to do-
rather than human being; whether it is human purposiveness and ra-
tionality or human striving more generally, to have a capacity as it 
relates to human di gnity, for both, is to have a power to do something 
distinctively human. Capaci ti es in thi s sense certain ly include rational 
capacities and the capacity fo r purposive action; yet they also include 
19 Nussbaum, '" Human Dignit y and Po liti cal Entitlement s," 362. 
20 Nussbaum, "Human Dignity and Political Entitl ements," 357 . 
21 Nussbaum, " I luman Dignity and Political Entitlement s," 363. 
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the kinds of basic human capabiliti es that Nussbaum enumerates, ca-
pabilities that arc related to rationality and purposive action, but not 
necessarily reducible to them. As Nussbaum in particular implies, hu-
man children have dignity-bearing capacities long before they develop 
agency. 
The question I wish to address, then, is whether these capacity-
grounded views of human worth can coherently account for a defini-
tion of dignity that purports to be both universal and equal. As noted 
above, l do not intend to examine or criticize the views of Gcwirth or 
Nussbaum per se, or, even, to question whether or not they can coher-
ently ground some conception of dignity. Rather, 1 seek to test them 
against a definition of dignity that affirms that dign ity, whatever else 
it may be, belongs to all human beings without exception in equal 
measure. Can either Gcwirth or Nussbaum coherently account for this 
kind of dignity? 
Basic Definitions of" Universality" and "Equality" 
As a starting point for making this eva luation, it is crucial to estab-
lish some basic meanings for both " universality" and "equality," and 
then to ask what these terms conceptually entail. The common, every-
day uses of these words do suffi cient work for the purposes of the ar-
gument. Describing something as "universal" means that it applies to 
every member of a given class or group, everywhere, all the time, with 
no exceptions. Not admitting of exceptions is particularly important 
for the conception of universality; if there is even one exception- that 
is, if even one member of a particular group or class docs not share the 
otherwise "un iversal" characteristic defining the group or class- then, 
by definition , the characteristic cannot be described as universa l. So 
to say "human dignity is universal" means that all humans have dig-
nity everywhere, all the time; or, put again, of the class/group "human," 
all members uni versally have worth. 
Given this definition, it would thus be conceptually incoherent to 
claim that "some humans have universal human di gnity" or "all hu-
mans have universal dignity in some places or sometimes," or "all hu-
mans have human dignity depending on .... " If dignity is universal-
conceptually independent of why or how it is uni versal- then it must, 
in an absoluti st sense, somehow inhere in, or otherwise apply to, every 
single human being without exception or the potenti al for an exception. 
Otherwise human dignity is not, by definition , universa l. 
Describing something as "equal," in turn, means claiming that it is 
quantitatively and/or qualitati vely identical everywhere it ex ists. As 
with universality, equality also has absolutist conceptual implications: 
one cannot say coherently, for example, to paraphrase the famous line 
from Animal Farm, "all humans have equa l dignity but some have 
more dignity than others." Conceptually, equality docs not admit of 
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degrees; there can be no " more" or " less." So to say that human beings 
have equal worth- aga in, independent o f why or how it is equal- is 
to say that human beings have absolu tely ident ica l worth, worth that 
inheres in the same way, to the same extent, in every individual who 
has worth. 
Combining the characteri stics of uni versa li ty and equality and ap-
plying them to a conception o f human dignity thus entail s the fo llow-
ing affirmation: every human being- that is, every indi vidua l being 
otherwise de fin ed as " human"- has worth in the same way and to the 
same extent as every other human being. If worth docs not extend to 
all human beings then it is not universa l. lf that worth admits o f any 
kind o f degree, even if it is uni versal, it is not equa l. Universa lly equal 
human di gnity, therefore, is an exhaustive, absolutist conception, at 
least from a formal, conceptual perspecti ve . It allows for no exclusions 
and admits of no dcgrccs .22 
lt is important to note, here, that uni versa lity and equality do not 
necessarily conceptua lly imply each other. To say someth ing is uni-
versal , in other words, is not necessarily to say that it is equa l; likewise, 
to say something is equal, is not necessaril y to affi rm that it is univer-
sa l. One could, for example, coherently profess a belie f that humans 
with a certain kind of characteristic or group of characteri stics have 
equal dignity, while those who do not possess that characteristic or 
group of characteri stics do not have equal digni ty. From such a per-
specti ve dignity would be de fined as equal, but not universa l. 
A poignant exampl e of this claim ca n be fo und in Aristotle's Ni-
comachean Ethics . T hough Ari stotle is often credited for making a 
distincti ve, ega litarian-tinted break with pre-Socratic Greek thought 
by examining the function or final cause of humans as such, inde-
pendently of the ir socia l status and role in the pol is (sec, e.g., I 097b, 
2 1-27), he clearly categorizes a large swath o f humanity as e ffect ively 
non-human in a moral sense. Take, fo r example, this passage often 
overlooked or downpl ayed by contemporary admirers of Ari stotle 's 
thought: 
[A nyone] who is go ing to be a competent student in the spheres of 
what is noble and what is just- in a word, politi cs must be brought 
22 1 do not mean to claim, even fro m a fo rma l perspecti ve, that uni versally equa l worth 
implies that a ll human beings must a ll be treated equal ly, only that they would have 
to be shown equa l moral regard This distinction between equa l trea tment and equal 
regard substanti vely and persuasively developed, fo r examp le, in Gene Outka 's 
book Agape: An Ethical Analysis (New Haven: Ya le University Press, 1972) - is es-
pecially important fo r answering the quest ion of how to apply a uni versally equal 
concept ion of human worth . O ne can eas il y imagi ne showi ng equa l moral regard to a 
fi ve year o ld and an e ighteen year old, fo r example; but one hopes they wou ld not be 
treated the same. 
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up well in its habits. For the first principle is the belief that something 
is the case, and if this is sufficiently clear, he wi ll not need the reason 
why as well. Such a person is in the possess ion of the first princip les, 
or could easily grasp them. Anyone with neither of these poss ibilities 
open to him should listen to [the poet] Hes iod: 
This person who understands everything for himself is the 
best of a ll , 
And noble is that one who heeds good adv ice. 
But he who neither understands it for himsel r nor takes to 
heart 
What he hears is a worthless man .23 
Aristotle 's claim about the potential value of a human being in this 
passage is not subtle. His claims for cqual.ity arc hardly universal. 
Aristotle essentially declares that any individual who has "not been 
brought up well" in "good habits"- which, means, we should be clear, 
those children not fortunate enough to have been born into the right 
kinds of households in the right kinds of civic environment- will in-
evitably not become virtuous, and thus inevitably fail to fulfill their 
proper function as a human being, which, according to Aristotle, ren-
ders them, borrowing Hesiod ' s words, "worthless." In other words, 
there are humans in Ari stotle' s world who, despite being classified as 
human (and therefore not classified as any other kind of animal) , have 
no intrinsic moral worth at all. They may look like humans, act (in a 
non-moral sense) like humans, and communicate like humans, but 
they arc not morally humans because they cannot realize their final 
cause or proper function: a life of virtue in service of the polis and in 
contemplation of the Unmoved Mover. 
This exclusion of a large swath of humanity from moral recogni-
tion docs not, however, prevent Aristotle from recognizing substantive 
moral equality among those who do have the good fortune to have 
been born and raised in a properly formed city-state. Indeed, in a way 
that might make him arguably more "egal itarian" than Plato, he even 
recognizes a kind of equal ity of opportun ity to become authentically 
virtuous, and thus happy in the eudainomistic sense, among those who 
have been rightly habituated in the polis: " I.For] all who arc not 
maimed as regards their potentiality for virtue," he writes in the Ethics, 
"may win it by a certain kind of study and care. "24 Everyone, in other 
words, has a relatively equal chance to become virtuous and thus fully 
23 Ari stotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Roger Cri sp (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 200), I 095b, 4-10. The quotation from Hesiod is found in Hesiod: The 
Works and Days, trans. Ri chmond Lattimore (Ann Arbor: University of Mich igan 
Press, 1959), 293 , 295-7 . 
24 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I 099b, 19-20. 
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human- so long as we understand "everybody" as those formed in 
good habits. So wh il e Socrates stands starkly isolated after explaining 
to his interlocutors how to ascend to the Form of the Good at the end 
of The Symposium, Aristotle dep icts a cornrnzmity of the virtuous in 
the polis, going so far as to locate friendship, which is only possible 
among equals in his view, as essentia l to fu lfilling one's final human 
purpose. Humans, therefore, can certainly be understood as morally 
equal to Aristotle, but not uni versally so. It is an example of how 
equality docs not necessarily presuppose universality . 
T he opposite also holds true: un iversality docs not necessarily en-
tail full cquality. 25 One could maintain, for example, that all humans, 
by virtue of being human , have some kind of objective worth that mor-
a ll y distinguishes us from all other forms of life. But that claim docs 
not necessari ly commit one to claiming that all humans have substan-
tively equal worth . For instance, one could beli eve that all humans, no 
matter what their measurable level of intelligence, have some kind of 
basic dign ity, but add that those who have IQ scores of at least I 00, or 
those who come from a particular blood li ne, or those who share cer-
ta in physical features have more dignity by virtue of belonging to an 
"enhanced" subset of humanity, which, the argument could then be 
made, entitles them to additional or enhanced rights and protections. 
It is one thing to say that everyone gets a s lice of the pie, another to 
say that every slice must be the same size. It is for this reason, then, 
that my argument's starting point is the claim that dignity is un iversal 
and equal. The attribution of equality to un iversality is not redundant. 
Universal Equality and Invulnerability 
If, then, human d ign ity is both universa l and eq ual, as I am assum-
ing, what, then , also must be true about dignity so-defined from a 
purely conceptual perspective? The condition for the possibility of 
universal equality, I bel ieve, takes the form of "invulnerability," and, 
specifical ly, invulnerabi li ty to harm (including ultimate harm or extir-
pation) and/or enhancement. 
As with un iversa lity and equali ty , a basic understanding of the term 
"invulnerability" adequately ill uminates the necessary point in th is 
context. To say something is invu lnerab le is, drawing on the word' s 
Latin roots, to say that it cannot be harmed or wounded. That is, the 
integrity and unity of that which is invulnerable cannot be qua litatively 
or quantitatively extirpated, effaced, or diminished in any way. The 
"cannot" here docs not mean that one cannot intend or t, y to cause 
25 Universali ty docs concept1ia ll y imp ly some measure or equality insofar as it is the 
case that if human worth is universa l then every human must have at least so me 
value . but that docs not mean that everyone nrnst have .rnbstcmtive~)' equal value 
so lely by virtue of being human. 
r 
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harm to that which is invulnerable; rather, it applies to the efficacy of 
such an act: if something is invulnerable one cannot effectively cause 
harm to it. lt is for this reason, too, that invulnerability also, according 
to the Oxford English Dictionary, means " unassa ilable;" that which is 
unassailable is that which cannotsucces:c,jully be attacked. Conversely, 
if something can be effectively assai led, and thus harmed or dimin-
ished in some way, it is not, by definition, in-vu lnerable. 
What, then, docs "invu lnerability" mean when describing a con-
ception of human worth, and why is it a necessary presupposition for 
uni versality and equality? Put simply, if dignity is not conceived of as 
invulnerable, then it cannot coherently be described as either universal 
or equal. Imagine, for example, a horrifying action or event that, we 
might say, causes severe or, even, irrevocable harm to those who ex-
perience it. Examples representing both "moral" and " natural " evi ls 
are, sadly, not difficult to think of: rape, torture, drug-addict ion, inca-
pacitating poverty, di sfiguring disease, injuries that leave victims con-
scious but otherwise completely immobile, mental illness and the loss 
of one's personality, etc. It goes without saying that these kinds of 
experiences deeply wound individuals, perhaps even causing, in ex-
treme cases, the loss of the person 's individuality in the sense of those 
unique characteristics that define a human as a specific person. But do 
they cause individuals to lose thei r individual dignity'? If so- again, 
purely from a conceptual perspective- we cannot therefore say that 
human dignity is universa l. Recognizing the potenti al loss of dignity, 
for whatever reason, is to recognize poss ibl e exceptions to the univer-
sality of human worth and, therefore, to contradict the possibility and 
coherence of universality itself. ffdignity can be eradicated or defaced 
in any way for whatever reason, in other words, then it is not some-
thing that can inhere in or apply to every human being w ithout excep-
tion. It is, rather, something that is conditional, something whose in-
tegrity and unity depends on whether or not it is respected or violated 
by one's own actions, the actions of others, and/or good or bad for-
tune. 26 "Universality," however, cannot coherently accommodate 
26 Ari stotle ' s thought, as noted above, cannot provide a cohcrcnl foundat ion for uni-
versa lly equal human worth (a conclusion that Ari stotl e wou ld mostl y likely not find 
problematic), but hi s conception of the normative human be ing and what defines hu-
man flouri shing is, neverthe less, deeply insightful for understanding the distinction 
between vulnerabili ty and invulnerability in this context. Wh il e Ari stotle recogni zes 
the possibility of li vi ng a fully-human li fe by cult ivat ing both mora l and intellectual 
virtue in service of the po lis and/or in contemplation o f the Unmoved Mover, he is 
clear that achieving such a life not on ly depends on being born into the right kind of 
community so that one can acquire, by absorption , the good hab its necessary for moral 
virtue in particular, it a lso depends on what the philosopher Thomas Nagel would call 
"moral luck" (sec Thomas Nagel, "Moral Luck," in Ethics: /-fisto, y, Theory, and Con-
temporary Issues, eds. S. Cahn and P. Markie [New York: Oxford University Press, 
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"condi tionality," and so if dign ity is conditi onal,Jor whatever reason, 
it is not uni versal. The only way to say that dignity is universal , there-
fore , is to say that it is invulnerable to any attempt to stri p or efface it, 
whether the attempt comes from human hands, natura l disaster, or the 
bad luck o f the geneti c draw. 
A similar argument can be made w ith regards to the relationship 
between invulnerabili ty and equality. Equali ty, reca ll , docs not con-
ceptuall y a llow for degrees; to say that something has more or less of 
a given quality than other entiti es with the same quality is to say, by 
definition, that it is unequal. Thus, if there is a kind of event, action, 
or environment that has the capacity to quanti tatively or qualitative ly 
diminish human worth in any way- no matter how much or to what 
extent- then we cannot say coherently that di gn ity is equal. The same 
goes for any event, action, or environment that has the capacity to 
quanti tatively or qua! itati vc ly augment or improve human worth, as 
well: i/ such a possibili ty ex ists, then di gni ty is not equal. Inde-
pendently of how we de line the ori gins and content of worth , in other 
words, to allow the possibili ty of any degree or gradation o f dignity is 
to render it unequal. Thus, as w ith uni versali ty , the on ly way to say 
that dignity is equal is to say that it is invulnerable- invu lnerable, in 
particular, to any kind o f in ternal or external power that would have 
the capacity to destroy, degrade, or improve it. 
It is fo r these reasons, therefore, that invulnerabi li ty is a necessary 
precondition for the claim that "digni ty is uni versally equal in all hu-
man beings." ff thi s claim is true about di gni ty, then the claim " human 
dignity is invulnerable" must also be true. Otherwise, we arc commit-
ted to recogni zing that human worth is somehow vulnerable; and if it 
is vulnerable, in any way for whatever reason, it is conceptually pos-
sibl e to eradi cate and/or weaken (or strengthen) it, and, consequently, 
conceptually impossible to ca ll it " uni versal" or "cqual."27 
2009], 752-6 1 ). Aristotle specifi cs tha t developing the virtues must take place "over 
a full li fe" in order fo r human li fe to fl ouri sh; if di saster strikes along the way say a 
debilitating loss of a loved one, or a traumati c injury, or th e emotional devastation or 
wrongly being accused o f a crime the humans of good hab its may ultimately fa ll 
short of their potenti al, and thus fai l to be Ii.i lly human, by, in effect , no fau lt of their 
own. It is instructi ve to compare this conception of 1110m l vulnerabili ty with the im-
plicit moral invulnerability fo und in Socrates's fa mous dec larat ion before being put 
to death : ' 'Wherefore, 0 judges, be of good cheer about death, and know this of a 
truth that no evil can happen to a good man." 
27 It is important to note that "human digni ty" and "human life" may be deeply inter-
related, but the fo rmer cannot be reducib le to the latter if dignity is to be understood 
as un iversal and equal. Lile, of course, not only can be lost, it can also exist in degrees 
in terms of greater or lesser biologica l fu nct ioning in re lati on to the standard of hea lthy 
fun ctioning. So while human digni ty may include human li fe, it cannot be reducible 
to it if aga in, di gnity is un iversally equa l. 
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Is Any Human Capacity Invulnerable? 
This brief foray into abstract conceptua l territory leads us back to 
the substantive central question, namely, whether either Gcwirth or 
Nussbaum can coherently account for universally equal dignity. And 
it appears we arc arriving at an answer: if, indeed, invulnerability, as 
this article has defined it, is a necessary condition for universality and 
equality, then it appears to be the case that no human capacity, or set 
of capacities, can coherently serve as the ground for a definition of 
universally equal dignity. In order to support the opposite conclu-
sion-namely, that capacities could provide such a justification-we 
would have to identify at least one human capacity that is invu lnerable 
to all attempts to harm and/or enhance it. Can we? 
Gcwirth and Nussbaum provide helpful test cases. Gcwirth, as 
noted above, founds his account of dignity on agency, which, in turn, 
he grounds in two characteristics of human action: I) voluntariness or 
freedom, and 2) purposiveness or intentionality, which includes ra-
tionality (one must be able to know what one is acting for in order to 
be an agent) . lf a human being docs not have these capacit ies, then a 
human is not an agent; and, by Gcwirth's own reasoning, if a human 
is not an agent, then she or he docs not have human worth. 
Gewirth recognizes the morally troubling nature of this claim, and 
so adds what he calls "prospective agents" to the protective umbrella 
of human worth. By prospective agents, he primarily means chi ldren, 
who arc not yet agents- because they do not yet have fu ll y developed 
free will or rationality- but who one day will be agents. Setting aside 
the problematic derivation of prospective agency as grounds for moral 
worth (prospective agency is not part or the dialectically necessary 
structure of human action, and therefore it is not clear how, on rational 
grounds, the supreme principle of morality can apply to children), it is 
important to ask whether agency, either in its actualized or potential 
form, is invulnerable to harm and/or enhancement. 
The question, r think, answers itself. Agency is not only something 
that can and docs exist in degrees in the sense of some humans having 
more agency than others; think, for example, of ch ildren who arc in 
the process of becoming full agents and foll agents who arc in the pro-
cess of becoming diminished agents because of age, disease, or injury. 
Agency, it appears, can also be completely destroyed. We need not 
only think of the exceptionally difficult moral cases of indi vidual s who 
arc alive but in a coma; individuals who have acute mental diseases, 
or who have been tortured, or who have been severely emotionally 
abused-they, too, can utterly lose their agency as Gcwirth defines it. 
Some individuals who suffer such disease and trauma may be able to 
regain their agency. But some won't. There arc many classes of indi-
viduals whom we otherwise define as human , in other words, who arc 
not, and never will be, "agents" in Gcwirth 's sense. 
The Problem of Universal Human Dignity 55 
Again, my goal here is not to critique Gcwi rth 's view of human 
dignity in and of itself, but, rather, to demonstrate that his account of 
agency, founded on the capacities of freedom and rationality, cannot 
coherently account for universally equal digni ty . Agency is deeply 
vulnerable to harm and/or enhancement, and can and docs exist in de-
grees. And insofar as it is vu lnerable in this way, as I sought to estab-
lish above, we cannot coherently say a conception of human dignity 
founded on agency is uni versa ll y equal. To be sure, Gcwirth may be 
able to justify some conception of dignity- perhaps we might ca ll it 
"personal dignity"-but he cannot coherently justify universally equal 
human dignity. 
The same conclusion app li es to Nussbaum ' s account of human 
worth . To be sure, Nussbaum seeks to ground digni ty on more than 
agency. However, even if we broaden the scope o f capacities eligible 
for justifying human worth, we arc still foundin g it on capacities: 
sense, imagination , friendship, play, contact with nature, even having 
bodily integrity- these arc things that human beings do or can poten-
tially do. And insofar as they arc things that we do, it is not only the 
case that some humans, even in potential form, can do them better or 
more effectively than others, which is to recognize, prima facie, that 
human capacities arc profoundly unequal. It is also to recognize that 
these capacities can, put simply, be taken away. lndecd, it is in great 
part for thi s reason that Nussbaum highlights the moral importance of 
these capacities; she wants individuals and communities to protect 
them and help them to flouri sh. However, the very recognition of the 
vu lnerabi lity of capacities, and, hence, the need to safeguard them, 
necessari ly leads to the conclusion that these capacities arc neither 
universal nor equal and, therefore , cannot coherently ground a univer-
sal ly equal conception of dignity. 
The more radical formulat ion of this claim goes beyond Nussbaum 
and Gcwirth. It app li es to all human capacities, however we might de-
fine them. The more basic claim is that no human capacity is unassail -
ab le. That is, there arc no human capacities that do not in some way 
depend on any number of internal (an individual 's own actions) or ex-
ternal ( one' s own genetics, the actions of others, the nature of one 's 
surrounding environment) conditions for their in itial existence, con-
tinued existence, and/or the degree to which they effectively operate 
for any particu lar purpose. If thi s claim accurately characterizes all 
human capacities, then al l human capacities arc vulnerable and, there-
fore , no human capacity is invulnerable. As such, no capacity can ac-
count for a universally equal , which, is to say, invulnerable conception 
of human worth. Put positively, any conception of universally equal 
human dignity that seeks to justify its universal equality based on a 
human capacity or set of human capacities is ncccssari ly incoherent. 
--
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Human Capacities and the Problem of Human Dignity 
This, then, is one of the fundamental problems inhering with in the 
conception of human dignity. If no human capacity can coherently 
cause or otherwise warrant invulnerable human dignity, what else arc 
we left with? What other " human someth ing" might be able to account 
not only for how we arc distinctively valuable, but also universally 
and equally so? If nothing humans do can account for dignity, perhaps, 
then , we can turn to what we biologically are. That is, perhaps human 
DNA, something that inheres universally and equally among all hu-
man beings, could provide the grounds for universally equal human 
worth . 
The problem with this line of thinking is that even if DNA could 
account for a conception of dignity as such, it is not c lear how it could 
account for human dignity in particular. The claim would essentially 
be that what makes humans valuable, the cause of our worth, is that 
we arc all bio-chcmically the same as a species. But how, then, are we 
morally different from any other species? How wou ld human dignity 
be any different qualitatively from the dignity of dolphins, guinea pigs, 
mosquitos, or any specific kind of bacterium? If shared DNA consti-
tutes the standard by which we attribute dignity to something, in other 
words, then all life , or at least every species of life, wou ld have equal 
dignity, in which case the "human" in "human dignity" wou ld be su-
pcrfluous.28 
We cannot, moreover, claim that DN A is invulnerable g iven ongo-
ing scientific "advancements" in genetic engineering . Human DNA 
can be, and has been, altered, including attempts to combine it with 
the DNA of non-human animal s. Whether such experimentation 
should be permitted and, if it is permitted, in what ways and under 
what conditions it should be allowed is a vital question. But the fact 
that it can happen at all challenges the status of human DNA as some-
thing that could account for a universa ll y equal conception of human 
dignity. Even if human DNA could never be annihilated save for some 
28 In th is sense, human life is radica lly simil ar to a ll oth er fo rms of biologica l li fe: we 
arc contingent beings who come into material ex istence and leave material ex istence 
by forces we have minimal (and, ult imately, no) control over. We arc part of the 
"givcncss" of ex istence. In this respect, we arc not unique, and, thu s, cannot cla im any 
moral di stinctiveness on the grounds of thi · givcncss. To be sure, humans, or most 
humans, can and do have a unique awareness of and response to this situation of 
givcncss; to say that we arc given is not to say that we do not have any freedom in 
re lation to being given. Yet this freedom, and the awareness underlying it, describes 
a capacity ; and any capacity or group o f capaciti es, as I sought to argue above, cannot 
coherently serve as the grounds of uni versa ll y equal dignity. ln other words, 
"givcncss" itself cannot account for makes human dignity "human," and the human 
response to givencssness cannot account for what makes human dignity universal and 
equal. (I am indebted to Roberto Dell 'Oro fo r the concept ion of·'givcncss" as a con-
stitutive fea ture of human existence.) 
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catastrophic global event that eradicated all human life (in which case 
the question of what warrants uni versally equal human dignity would 
become moot) , there is nothing intrinsic to the nature of DN A itself 
that prevents it from being corrupted in the sense o f al tering its original 
integri ty. There is nothing, in other words, that conceptually or prac-
tically guarantees that all humans will , by virtue of their humanity, 
remain equal in terms of our shared genetic structure. So in addition 
to the problem of justifying how and why human DNA could generate 
worth in general and human worth in particular, it seems that even the 
very b lueprint of human life is not, ultimately, invulnerable and thus 
not capable of accounting for a universally equa l account of human 
worth. 
The fundamental problem of human dign ity, then, appears to be 
this : In order to claim that human di gnity is universal and cqual-
which, again, is to claim that every being otherwise defined as "hu-
man" has equal worth qua human- we cannot appeal to anyth ing that 
is in human beings or of'human beings qua humans, including all hu-
man capacities, in order to justify that worth . Thi s is doubly a problem 
because, as Gewirth and Nussbaum effectively illustrate, to be human 
from a moral perspective is, in a dec isive sense, to possess and employ 
di stinctive ly human capacities like freedom , and purposiveness, and 
imagi nation, and fr iendship. How could we conceive of human beings 
as valuable without reference to these kinds o f' capacities? 
JOHN PAUL ll 'S THEISTIC CONCEPTION OF DIGNITY 
AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
The question, in other words, becomes whether it is possible to co-
herently conceive of human dignity as universally equal in a way that 
recogn izes the va lue of human capaciti es yet is not ultimate ly depend-
ent upon those capacities. There is at least one way, I believe, and it 
takes the form of a thei stic conception o r dignity, like, for example, 
that which we sec in the thought of Pope John Paul IL 
As a preliminary point, I wish to emphasize that l mean " theism" 
in its most basic and widely-accepted sense for the purposes of the 
argument in thi s context: namely, the affirmati on of the existence of a 
transcendent and personal divine being. The qualiti es of " transcend-
ence" and "personal" arc both important here. To say that a being is 
transcendent is to say that it ex ists independent ly of everything else in 
ex istence, to say, that is, that it docs not depend ontologically on any 
other being. In thi s sense, a transcendent being is a lso, by defin ition, a 
non-contingent being, and insofar as it is non -contingent, it is, there-
-
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fore, also ontologically invulnerable to everything in existence-noth-
ing in existence, in other words, has the capacity to eradicate, dimin-
ish, or enhance its existence. 29 
Yet this kind of ontological independence and invulnerability docs 
not mean that a transcendent being cannot be in re lation with that 
which is non-transcendent. It is not a definitional contradiction, in 
other words, for theism to claim that the transcendent being is also a 
personal being. As transcendent and, thus, ontologically independent, 
the divine docs not need to be in relationship with non-contingent re-
ality, including human beings; yet theism claims that the divine non-
contingent being chooses to be in this kind of relationship. In this way, 
then, theism can affirm that the non-contingent and contingent-the 
divine and the human, in this context-can and do have a relationship. 
Pope John Paul JI presents this kind of theistic view of God-in-
relation throughout his theological writings, but especially in his en-
cyclical , Evangelium vitae (The Gospel ofLife). The text commences 
with an affirmation that life, in its fu llest sense, means eternal life in 
communion with the divine: "Man is called to a fullness of life," John 
Paul writes, "which far exceeds the dimensions of hi s earth ly existence, 
because it consists in sharing the very life of God."30 Yet he quickly 
and carefully qualifies this assertion by c larifying that humankind's 
final goal of communion with God docs not diminish the value of tem-
poral life. To the contrary, it is the very call to communion with the 
divine that endows temporal life with its worth and s ignificance. As 
he writes, "The loftiness of this supernatural vocation reveals the 
greatness and the inestimable value of human life even in its temporal 
phase. Life in time ... is the fundamental condition, the initial stage 
and an integral part of the entire unified process of human cxist-
cncc."31 
This synthetic relationship between the transcendent and the tem-
poral plays a crucial role in defining John Paul 's conception of dignity. 
On the one hand, he seeks to ground the worth of the person in the 
individual' s supernatural origin and destiny; human beings, he argues, 
29 It is important to note here that to say the divine is invulnerable to the created world 
(including human action) is not to say that the created world, espec ia lly including 
human action, can or docs not affect the divine. Indeed, from with in the thought of 
John Paul II specifically, and many strands of Christian thought more broad ly, it mat-
ters profoundly to God whether or not human beings choose to accept God's invitation 
to relationship and communion. God, in thi s sense docs not need, but God docs de-
sire - in this case, God desires fellowship and it is meaningful to the divine whether 
or not human beings exercise their freedom to fulfi ll that desire (and, by doing so, to 
fulfi ll their own humanity). In this sense, human action docs not '·harm" or "improve" 
God from an ontological perspective, but it docs make a di)./erence to God . 
JO John Paul II , Tl1e Go.1pe/ a/Life , (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 1995), 12. 
JI John Paul II , The Gospel of Life, 12. 
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arc created in the image of' God and, though f'al lcn, redeemed by 
Christ 's death and resurrection, wh ich enables humans to return to 
God , our one and only true home. Indeed, the very fact that God chose 
to redeem humanity despite our sin by becoming human both estab-
li shes and confirms the unparalle led value of' humanity and of each 
human life. As John Paul avers, "Truly great must be the va lue of hu-
man Ii f'c if the Son of' God has taken it up and made it the instrument 
o f the salvation of all humanity! "32 
Y ct John Paul also maintains that the process of returning to God, 
of being justified and sanctified, takes place in the concrete socia l and 
hi storical circumstances that each ind ividua l occupies during her spc-
ci fic lifetime. Dignity 's supernatural origin and destiny, in other 
words, plays itself out in each indi vidual 's natural li fe. " [Life on 
earth] ," he affirms, " remains a sacred reality entrusted to us, to be 
preserved with a sense of responsibility and brought to perfection in 
love and in the gift or ourselves to God and to our brothers and sis-
ters. "33 
In recogni zing these two poles of human existence, the natural and 
the supernatural, The Gospel of'Li/e thus seeks to provide an account 
of dignity that is both transcendent and temporal in such a way that 
the transcendent- our origin in the divine and final destiny as com-
munion w ith the divine- acts as both the ground and goal of temporal 
life. As John Paul expla ins, "The dignity ol'this life is linked not only 
to its beginning, to the fact that it comes from God, but also to its fina l 
end, to its destiny or fe ll owship with God in know ledge and love of 
him."34 
Thi s "dual citizenship" between natural and supernatura l existence 
also helps explain John Paul ' s conception or how the image of God 
re lates to human dignity. Humans have dignity because we arc created 
in God's image, which, fo r John Paul , means that humans have capac-
ities analogous to God' s capacities, something that is unique in Crea-
tion . As he wri tes, "The /(le whi ch God offers to man is a g(fi. by which 
God shares something ofhimse(/with his creature. "35 That which God 
shares with human beings not only includes stewardsh ip over Crea-
tion, but also, as he specifies, " those spiritua l faculties which arc di s-
tinctively human, such as reason, discernment between good and ev il , 
and free will." 36 To be human , in other words, is to be able to know 
the good as good and to be able to freely choose to act in accordance 
with it. Humans arc unique in Creation, moreover, not only because 
32 John Paul 11 , The Gospel of Li/e, 59, document 's emphas is. 
33 John Paul 11 , The Gospel o/Lif e, 12, document's emphasis. 
J. I John Paul II , The Gospel Cl/Life, 65. 
35 John Paul II, The Gospel of Life 60, document 's emphasi ·. 
36 John Pau l II , The Gospel o/Li/e, 60. 
r 
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we possess these capacities, but also because we possess the potential 
to employ them for their intended purposes: attaining virtue in thi s life 
so that we may, by God's gracious gift, enjoy communion with God 
in the next. The value human beings have by virtue of these capacities 
associated with the image of God is thus attached both to capacities 
themselves and for the ends for which they can and ought to be used. 
John Paul is careful, however- and th is is crucial for the artic le's 
overall argument- to avoid the conclusion that either the image of 
God in humanity or the dignity associated with it is reducible to these 
capacities. Indeed, one of the greatest themes in the encyc li cal is John 
Paul 's lamentation that the contemporary world regards those with di-
mini shed capacities as having less value than other human beings. As 
he writes, "It is clear that .. . there is no place in the world for anyone 
who, like the unborn or the dying, is a weak clement in the social struc-
ture, or for anyone who appears completely at the mercy of others and 
is radically dependent on them, and can on ly communi cate through 
the silent language of a profound sharing of affcction. "37 The recogni-
tion of human dignity thus enj oins all individuals to recognize that 
every person has the same intrinsic worth as every other person, and 
that to be "a person" is not only defined by what we can do, but also, 
and more fundamentally , by who we are: indi vidua ls created in the 
image of God and redeemed by Chri st ' s li fe, death, and resurrection. 
37 John Paul 11 , The Gospel o/Li/e, 36. The re lationship between the image of God as 
being valuable independently of human capacit ies and the image of God as being val-
uable because of human capacities is compl ex in John Paul II 's thought. On the sur-
face, it may appear to be a contradicti on how can he claim that human beings are 
both valuable because they have d istinctively human capacities yet also deny that 
those capacities confirm va lue on human li fe? Whil e a fu ll exposition of this c lement 
of John Paul 's conception of dignity fall s outs ide the scope of th is artic le, it is im-
portant to note that th is need not ncccssar i ly be interpreted as a cont rad iction i f we 
understand the image of God not on ly as an onto logica l constitut ive feature of who 
human beings arc, but a lso as a potential to be realized. Insofar as the image of God 
ontologically defin es humans as dign ifi ed , it docs so independen tl y o f any capacity or 
the exercise of that capacity; in sofar, however, as the image of God defines d ign ity as 
a potential to be realized (so, for examp le, one can become more fu lly human from a 
mora l standpoint by acting in accordance with the image of God and less human by 
acting in ways that vio late the image), then capac iti es and the exercise of those capac-
ities play an essential ro le in determining whether the potentia l inherent in the image 
of God is rea lized or not. In th is sense, one can say, as John Paul does, that a murderer 
docs not lose his dignity in thi s sense of hi s onto logica l g irt ofhuman ity by murdering, 
yet sti ll maintain that the act of murder very much thwarts the realization of the indi-
vidual 's g ift of humani ty in atta ining its full potentia l. Although John Paul docs not 
expli citly defin e dignity in this way, I believe there are strong grounds for in terpreting 
his conception of dign ity and the Catho li c socia l thought trad ition ' s conception of 
dignity more broadly · as having these two interrelated but d ist inct components one 
given , one atta ined. Whi le a full defense of th is claim requires substantia l add itional 
argumentation, it at least helps indicate why John Paul might not be contradicting 
himself on this point. 
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God, John Paul argues, values every person as a person independently 
of their capacities, and, therefore, so must we: " fThc] deepest element 
of God's commandment to protect human life is the requirement to 
show reverence and love fo r every person and the life of every pcr-
son."38 
Thi s emphasis on the intrinsic, God -given va lue of all human lite, 
in turn , exp lains why John Paul fi·cquent ly descri bes dignity as " invi-
olable" and "indestructible." Although located in humans, human dig-
ni ty is grounded in God, and so out of the reach of human attempts to 
harm or destroy. As he writes, "It is therefore urgently necessary ... to 
rediscover those essential and innate human and moral va lues which 
fl ow from the very truth of the human being and express and safeguard 
the dign ity of the person: va lues which no individual, no majority, and 
no state can ever create, modify or destroy, but must only 
acknowledge, respect and promotc."39 Insofar as dign ity instantiates a 
divine truth about who human beings arc- created in God's image and 
redeemed by Chri st- there is nothing that the created world can do, 
as the passage says, to "create," " modify," or "destroy" that truth. Hu-
man beings are intrinsica lly and objective ly valuable because God val-
ues every human being no matter what humans (or anythi ng else in 
the created world) do or fai l to do. 
Dignity thus can be recognized or fa il to be recognized by other 
individuals, societies, cu ltures, states, etc . But whether or not it is rec-
ogn ized has no effect on the integrity of the dignity itself. [ndccd, 
God 's constituti ve, creative, and redemptive relationship with every 
individual creates worth that is, properly understood, " indestructible." 
Using the Book of Exodus to describe the effect that God's love has 
on human beings, John Paul explains, "Freedom from slavery meant 
the gift of an identity, the recognition o r an indestructible dignity and 
38 John Paul 11 , Th e Gospel ojLi/e, 69, docmncnt 's emphasis. The distinct ion between 
·'human life" and " human dignity" is a basic yci crucia l distinction in John Paul's 
conception of dignity. /\ t times, he appears to emp loy the terms "human li fe" and 
"human dignity" as synonyms, as, for example, when he states, "The present encyc li -
cal. .. is rhcrc lo rc meant to be a prec ise and vigorous rca rlirmat ion ol'the value of hu-
man life and its inviolability" (John Pau l II , The Gospel o/Li/e. 17). Y ct he also writes, 
"Certa inly the life o/ the hody in its earth Iv slate is not w1 absolute good fo r the be-
liever, espec ially as he may be asked to give up hi s life for a greater good" (John Paul 
II , The Gospel o/Li/e. 17, document's emphasis). Actin g in conformity with the Gos-
pel of Li fc, in other words, may call one to sacrifice her biologica l li fe , which wou ld 
not harm one ' s di gnity but, lo lhe contrary, be in accordance with one's digni ty and 
even help bring it to its mora l fu lfi ll ment. Human dignil y thus includes human life, 
but it is not reducible to human life . This distinction also draws on the disti nction 
between human di gnit y being both transcendent and temporal and, consequently, both 
vu lnerab le and invulnerable (sec footnote 37 above). 
39 John Paul II, The Gospel o/Li/e, I 16, emphasis added . 
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the beginning ofa new history in which the di scovery o f God and d is-
covery of self go hand in hand ."40 Indeed, thi s human " identity" as 
intrinsically and indestructibly valuable is rooted so firmly in the in-
dividual that even those who commi t grave moral o ffenses retain their 
equal worth, a claim that explains why John Paul can affirm, "Not even 
a murderer loses his personal dignity, and God himself pledges to 
guarantee this ."4 1 This invulnerability of human di gnity to human ac-
tion, or anything else in the created world, ultimately results from the 
invulnerability of its divine source. "Human life," John Paul concludes, 
"i s thu s given a sacred and inviol able character whi ch refl ects the in-
violability of the Creator himsclf. "42 
CONCLUSION 
While the validity or truth-status o f John Paul II ' s conception of 
human worth remains a crucial questi on-one that I deliberately beg 
in this context- his theistic defini tion of dignity nevertheless provides 
a conceptually coherent foundati on for hi s affirmati on that a ll human 
beings have equal worth . Reca ll , as argued above, that the condition 
for the possibility of "universality" and "equality," from a conceptual 
perspective, is invulnerability to the poss ibility of ex tirpation, harm, 
and/or enhancement. In recogni zing God as transcendent and, there-
fore, inviolable, and, furthermore, by describing thi s inviolable being 
as estab lishing an inviolab le relati onship with every human individual , 
John Paul can say that his account of di gnity is uni versa l and equal 
without inconsistency. Given that human worth is grounded in the 
non-contingent, there is nothing that we, the contingent, can do to 
eradicate, harm, or, even enhance it. And thi s invulnerable worth , John 
40 John Paul JI , The Gospel a/Life, 55. 
4 1 John Paul II , Th e Gospel a/Life 24, document 's emphasis . 
42 John Paul !I , The Gospel a/ Life, 88. Although John Paul uses the term .. in violable" 
to descri be dignity here, I have chosen to use the term " invulnerable" throughout the 
article to describe the same characteristic. Thi s is not accidenta l. In one sense, the 
terms could be understood as being interchangeab le: if something cannot be .. vio-
lated" then it is, in a decis ive way, in vulnerable to harm. 1 lowcver, drawing on th e 
term 's Latin roots, I want to emphasize that dignity must be conceived as someth ing 
that litera lly cannot be "wounded" in order to be defin ed as uni versa lly equal. I be lieve 
" invulnerability" captures this conceptual necessity more e ffect ively than .. invio labil-
ity." 
That is not to say, however, that dignity must only be de fin ed as in vulnerable. Al t-
hough defending thi s cla im fa lls outside the ·cope of this article, I beli eve there is a 
way to coherently defin e digni ty as vuln erab le to harm (thus necessitat ing that it be 
protected and allowed to fl ourish) without sacrificing its invulnerabi lity, and, hence, 
universal equality. To do so, one can, I be lieve, defi ne digni ty as both a static onto-
logical qua li ty in a ll human be ings (invulnerable) and also as a potentia l to be rea li zed 
(vulnerable) . See footnote 37 above. 
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Paul makes c lear, extends to all , regardless of' each individual's dis-
tinct set of capacities, 
It is crucial to note, however, that John Paul docs not establish his 
conception of universally equa l dignity independent ly of human capa-
b ilities, To act freely and with purpose, to be able to engage in practi-
cal and specu lat ive reasoning, to immerse oneself in one's own imag-
ination and the imaginations of others, to form fami lies, to love God 
and others- these and other capabilities form a fu ndamental part of 
our moral identity as bearers of the image of God, But, in the end, they 
in no way constitute the sum tota l of our moral identity, In other words, 
it is not what we do that morally defines our worth as human beings, 
It is who we are: beings created in the image of' God and redeemed on 
the Cross. And, unlike Gcw irth and Nussbaum, John Paul can coher-
ently say that that va lue-conferring fact app li es to all humans every-
where al l the time in abso lute equal ity, It is a digni ty ofno exceptions. 
This theistic vision of human worth, in the end, raises important 
and challenging theological , anthropological , and epistemological 
questions. Given the argument here, one could ask: Is it only the Chris-
tian- or Catholi c- conception of the divine that can account for uni-
versa lly equal human dignity? How arc we to conceive of the image 
of God in re lati on to human worth more specifi cal ly, especially in light 
of the Catho lic and Christian recognition of human sin? How is this 
God who gives worth to be known? Docs universa l human dignity ul-
timately depend on a faith claim that, in turn , is ultimately reducible 
to a blind affirmation of religious authority? If so, how mi ght these 
epistemological restrictions affect the status of dignity's universality 
and equal ity? Also, if human dignity is ultimately invulnerable to 
harm, does that ultimately render it a moral ly inert principle? Why, for 
example, have rights to protect dignity if it docs not need protection? 
These arc crucial questions that a deeper examination of a theistic ac-
count of human dignity would have to answer (and which I have 
sought to address clscwhcrc43). 
Yet the central issue animat ing th is article sti ll remains: What is 
the condition for the possibility of coherent ly describing human di g-
nity as universa lly equa l? The answer, it appears, ultimate ly points to 
the Transcendent, Ir we wish to define human worth as truly universa l 
43 For furth er discussion sec Matthew Pctrusck, ' ·Catholi c Social Ethics and the 
(ln)vulncrabi lity of Human Dign ity" (Dissertat ion, Univers ity of Chi cago, 20 13), 
( 
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and truly equal , we must somehow locate its ground beyond humanity 
and outside the reach of human hands.44 ID 
44 As a parti ng note, it is important to stress that theism as it relalcs to human dignity 
can potentially accommodate a great diversity of conceptions o f' the divine, including 
those (depending on their precise theological interpretati on) generally attributed to the 
three Abrahamic fa iths. In other words, whi le great and irreducible conceptual differ-
ences exist between Yahweh, All ah, and the Father, Son and Ho ly Spirit , insofar as 
each trad ition's in terpretation of God includes the recogn iti on of God 's non-con tin-
gency, agency, and value-conferring relationship with humans, there is no reason, 
from a conceptual perspecti ve, why any one of these th eisti c conceptions could not 
provide a coherent foundati on for uni versally equal human di gnity "coherent" in the 
sense of being able to account for digni ty' s universality and equality. And so, poten-
tially, with any other conception of the d ivine in any other reli gious tradit ion: as long 
as it attributes non-contingency and some kind of' agency to God, and can describe 
how God employs God ' s agency to endow all human beings with equal worth, there 
is no reason why many different conceptions o f the di vine could not coherentl y sup-
port the claim "human beings have universally equal dignity. " This is not to say that 
any and every such account would be true; it is to say that every and any such account 
could, from a conceptual perspective, potent ially be c:oherent. 
